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SUMMARY

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION REPORT

25X1C

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SOUTHEAST ASIA ACTIVITY REPORT

SELECTED TRANSPORTATION AND INFILTRATION COMPENDIUM

Insurgency in Cambodia

NPIC/R-30/67
FEBRUARY 1967

SUMMARY NO 36

GROUP 1: EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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PREFACE

This edition of the Selected Transportation and Infiltration Compendium is a special summary of insurgency in Cambodia. The information represents a comparative study by NPIC of aerial photography over a two-year period.

The report is divided into eight geographic sections representing areas of concentrated insurgent activity. Each section is introduced by a locator map, and contains photographs, mosaics, and smaller scale maps as aids to the discussion of the area.

A sectional index of mission references, NPIC briefing boards, and NPIC cable references is included on the final pages of this report.

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INTRODUCTION

This report is intended to provide a survey of communist insurgent activity in eastern Cambodia with photographic documentation of those areas exhibiting the highest degree of concentration and current significance.

More than 200 areas of probable insurgent activity have now been identified and/or confirmed by NPIC inside Cambodia. The scope of this activity in 1966 alone expanded quite rapidly as increased pressure from allied military operations made such a sanctuary necessary and the unusually prolonged monsoon season severely interrupted the flow of material from North Vietnam through Laos.

As allied operations continue in 1967, particularly along the ill-defined, unpopulated, and remote northeast border areas of Cambodia, the communist forces could expand their exploitation of Cambodia for supplies, storage, medical care, training, rest and rehabilitation, and secure routes for the infiltration of personnel from North Vietnam.

With the communist road net completed in southern Laos, and a subsequent rapid build-up and deployment of American forces in South Vietnam in late 1965 and early 1966, subtle changes in topography and social patterns were observed on aerial photography throughout those eastern Cambodian border areas adjacent to Laos and South Vietnam. These changes were noted after a detailed comparison of older data base photography with recent [redacted] aerial photography utilizing a 112-B camera system which provided better resolution. This comparison revealed signatures identical to those of known communist activity observed in Laos and South Vietnam during a similar period. 25X1A

[redacted]

25X1B Detected Areas of Insurgency

There has been a recent rapid development of a probable insurgent base area along the southern border of Mondulkiri and Kratie provinces, Cambodia, extending from the northeast fringes of war-zone C, eastward to the Dak Dam/O'Reang area (See Section VI). Within this area, photographic signatures have helped identify 3 partially concealed, heavily used motorable roads that directly integrate the Cambodian logistics net (i.e. routes 131 and 14) and the communist trail network in adjoining Binh Long and Phuc Long provinces, South Vietnam. Evidence of probable insurgent encampments and numerous plots of insurgent-type row crop agriculture on a previously unrecorded scale have also been identified on aerial photography.

Suspect insurgent support facilities exhibiting signatures normally associated with communist truck park/storage areas in Laos have also been observed under construction since [redacted] along a logistics network of roads extending from the Kratie/Chhlong area adjacent to the Mekong, east to the aforementioned insurgent base area. 25X1D

An area comprising Stung Treng and Ratanakiri provinces continues to be of significance, particularly the Tonle Kong and Tonle San rivers. A notable increase in water-borne activity was observed on aerial photography during [redacted] and early [redacted] as compared with [redacted] (See Sections I, II, and III). Large motorized craft have become increasingly prevalent on the Tonle Kong from Stung Treng north to the Laos/Cambodian border. Sixty-one motorized river craft were identified on [redacted] between Siempang and the numerous known transshipment/storage facilities situated along the river near the Cambodia/Laos border. 25X1D 25X1D 25X1D

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Motorized river craft on the Tonle San have likewise increased, particularly during the [redacted] period. Although no accurate figures were kept on the number of river craft observed throughout [redacted] a maximum one-day total of 18 motorized river craft was observed between Virachei and a transshipment/storage facility approximately 7.2 nm west of the Cambodia/South Vietnam border.

25X1D

The completion in [redacted] of Cambodia Route 97 extending north from the Siempang area to the Cambodia/Laos border to connect with the road net in the Laotian Panhandle, provided an alternate and supplemental logistics route in the Tonle Kong area.

Additional areas of concentrated insurgent activity have been identified in the Tri-Border area of Cambodia (Section I); along the Prek Drang (stream) and Tonle Srepok (river) (Sections IV and V); adjacent to the border north of Dak Dam (Section VII); and in the vicinity of Svay Rieng (Section VIII).

Detailed photographic interpretation of each of these areas is presented in the indicated sections. Other probable insurgent facilities/activity are annotated on the large scale maps accompanying each section. While these facilities are not discussed in depth, they have been photographically identified and/or confirmed by NPIC, and each exhibits one or more of the "insurgent signatures."

Although not directly associated with this activity, Figure 1 photographically depicts a typical insurgent camp and the construction techniques which make airborne detection difficult.

References are made to previous issues of the "Southeast Asia Activity Report-Selected Transportation and Infiltration Compendium" wherein specific insurgent facilities were identified. Additional insurgent activity will be periodically included in subsequent issues of this report as appropriate.

NPIC L-6929 (2/67)

FIGURE 1. TYPICAL INSURGENT CAMP, SOUTH VIETNAM

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

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

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25X1D

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

FIGURE 1. TYPICAL INSURGENT CAMP, SOUTH VIETNAM

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

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SECTION I

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SECTION I

The Tonle Kong (river) area between Siempang, Cambodia, and the Cambodia/Laos border is the central link in an extensive probable communist logistics net extending from Stung Treng to the Tri-Border insurgency area. This 56-nm river segment and the adjacent areas between 14-07N 106-23E and 14-35N 106-32E have exhibited an increasing, high degree of activity since the [redacted] 25X1D completion of the communist road net in the southern Laotian Panhandle.

Road construction, consisting primarily of intermittent clearing operations generally paralleling the eastern bank of the Tonle Kong, was first observed between Cambodia Route 194 and Ban San Keo Airfield on photography of [redacted] 25X1D By the end of [redacted] clearing had been extended for a short distance 25X1D north of the airfield and a major section of road was under construction in Laos extending west from Route 96. On photography of [redacted] the two segments 25X1D were connected and vehicle tracks were observed along the entire length of the 103-nm road frequently referred to as the "Sihanouk Trail." Those portions of the road in Cambodia and Laos were subsequently designated Routes 97 and 110, respectively. The distinction between typical Cambodian road construction and the essentially covert nature of Route 97 is readily apparent when Figure 2 is compared with the photographs of Route 97, Figures 9 through 17.

25X1D

25X1D There was a substantial increase in the number of motorized river craft utilizing the aforementioned segment of the Tonle Kong during [redacted] particularly subsequent to the completion of Route 97. The following observations of craft on selected dates are representative of the water-borne activity during the 25X1D respective periods and indicate the full impact of the noted increase: on [redacted] 25X1D [redacted] a total of 7 craft; on [redacted] a total of 35 craft; and on [redacted] a 25X1D total of 61 craft -- the highest single-day recorded observation. Although the severe weather conditions of the monsoon season seriously hampered photographic collection, isolated sightings of craft concentrations indicated a continuation of the water-borne activity during this period. A detailed analysis of motorized river craft is presented on pages 10-15, Figures 4, 5, and 6.



25X1D

NPIC L-6936 (2/67)

FIGURE 2. TYPICAL CAMBODIAN ROAD CONSTRUCTION, TB MEANCHEY AREA, CAMBODIA (13-48N 104-59E)

25X1D

Twelve probable transloading and transshipment points were identified on the Tonle Kong north of Siempang between [redacted]. Two points along the western bank of the river (one shown in Figure 6) and a probable point on Don Fai Island have been used for transloading. Seven of the nine identified probable transshipment points are located north of Ban San Keo Airfield and are all connected to Route 97 by short access roads.

The southern portion of Route 97 never exhibited a high degree of activity and it very shortly became overgrown from disuse. Any intention to utilize the road as a complete alternate or supplemental supply route north from Siempang was apparently abandoned. The remaining portion of the road and Laos Route 110 continued in heavy use until the monsoon season. Only one camouflaged truck was identified however, indicating a pattern of night movement characteristic of the communist Laotian road network. A subsequent gradual deterioration of Routes 97 and 110 because of severe weather conditions occurred by [redacted] at which time only the trail generally paralleling the road showed any evidence of activity. 25X1D

25X1D There was evidence of reactivation of Route 110 west of Route 96 on [redacted] 25X1D [redacted] and by the end of the month recent vehicle tracks were observed along the entire segment and into Cambodia (Figures 18 and 19). A new probable transshipment point was identified during this period immediately south of the Cambodia/Laos border and connected to Route 97 by an active service road. That segment of Route 97 utilized prior to the monsoon season is again serviceable and exhibiting heavy vehicular activity (Figures 9 through 17) and sightings of motorized river craft on the Tonle Kong are becoming more frequent. By [redacted] Route 96/110 extending towards the Tri-Border insurgency area had also been reopened (Figure 3). 25X1D



FIGURE 3. JUNCTION OF ROUTES 96, 110 AND 96/110, [redacted]

25X1D

Additional confirmation of the continuing existence of the Stung Treng/Tri-Border area logistics net is provided by the current road status in the vicinity of Siempang. Multiple heavily used vehicle tracks are observed along Route 14 (tentatively redesignated Route 136). This route, together with Route 13, provides a motorable link between Siempang and Stung Treng. A comparative analysis of the unnumbered road extending north from Route 14, immediately west of Siempang, and that portion of Route 14 continuing into Siempang, indicates that vehicular traffic from the south is divided equally between the two roads (Figures 7 and 8). The unnumbered road continues north to a village on the Tonle Kong, then west along the river approximately 0.7 nm to a possible transshipment area. A spur road by-passes the village and also terminates at the transshipment area.

The Siempang area is also an integral part of the probable communist logistics net extending from Stung Treng to Virachei and then east along the Tonle San (river) to the Cambodia/South Vietnam border. (The complete water-borne route is discussed in Section II.) A 12.5-nm alternate segment of Route 194 between Siempang and Virachei was constructed concurrently with Route 97. The roads are comparable by their partial concealment and associated truck parks and storage facilities. These in turn closely correspond to similar communist activity in the Laotian Panhandle. Route 194 was also in disuse during the recent peak monsoon season and has now been reactivated to a limited extent. It again provides the most direct motorable route between Stung Treng and Virachei.

Detailed Analysis of Motorized River Craft

25X1D

The majority of the motorized river craft observed on the Tonle Kong are approximately 25 to 30 feet in length with an average beam of [redacted] and are powered by long shaft outboard motors. Other craft are in the 30 to 45 foot class, with beams ranging to 10 feet. Based on an average approximate length-width-ratio, these craft can transport 2 metric tons of supplies (1 metric ton = 2,204.62 pounds). The tonnage capacity varies with the length and width of the individual craft.

The depth of these craft is estimated at approximately 3 to 3½ feet amidships. Maximum draft with a 2-metric ton cargo would be approximately 15 to 16 inches, based upon 3 inches per 1,100 pounds plus 3 to 4 inches for dead weight. With a maximum load, this would allow for a freeboard (clearance above water) of approximately 1 foot, which is probably sufficient to navigate the Tonle Kong during high and intermediate water stages. A reduction in cargo to 1 metric ton during the low water periods would allow these motorized craft to negotiate the numerous rapids with approximately 9 to 10 inches maximum draft.

During the low water stage (January-April) and the intermediate water stage-receding (December), the majority of the supplies are probably trucked from Stung Treng to the Siempang area for transshipment. Sixty-one craft (the highest single-day observation), carrying a reduced cargo of 1 metric ton, could transport a total of 732 metric tons of supplies from Siempang to the northernmost transshipment point during each of these months. This figure is based on a 2½-day round trip, allowing a total of 12 trips per month per craft.



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FIGURE 4. MOTORIZED RIVER CRAFT MOORED IN RAPIDS, TONLE KONG (RIVER)

During the remaining water stages (May-November), the majority of the supplies are probably shipped directly from Stung Treng to the border area, with some supplemental trucking to Siempang for transshipment. Sixty-one craft, carrying a maximum cargo of 2 metric tons, could transport a total of 1,220 metric tons of supplies from Siempang to the northernmost transshipment point during each of these months. This figure is based upon a 3-day round trip, allowing a total of 10 trips per month per craft.

Based on these calculations, a total of 11,895 metric tons of supplies could have been transported in 1966 from Stung Treng to the Tri-Border area for further distribution to communist forces in South Vietnam. Even considering the unusually prolonged monsoon season, this is believed to be a conservative estimate. It only represents the capability of an observed number of craft and does not consider shipment to the southernmost transshipment point, an alternate which could halve the distance between Siempang and the border area.

Detailed tables and a bar graph depicting the normal annual rainfall distribution for this area are on pages 12 and 14.

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

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

SOUTH VIETNAM

CAMBODIA

VITY

TONLE SAN
(RIVER)

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

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ROUTE 110

3
1
(FIGS. 5,6)
11
3
4
1
1
1
3
1
BAN SAN KEO
1
4
8
1
(FIG. 4)

ROUTE 97

7
4
TONLE KONG
(RIVER)
2
2
2
2
7
1

SELECTED SIGHTINGS OF
MOTORIZED RIVER CRAFT

25X1D

JOG (A) SERIES 1501
SHEETS ND 48-7 & 48-8
1ST EDITION DEC 65
SCALE 1:250,000

SIEMPANG

ROUTE 194

ROUTE 14

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[redacted]

WATER LEVELS–TONLE KONG

25X1D [redacted]



NORMAL ANNUAL RAINFALL, TONLE KONG RIVER VALLEY

MONTH	WATER LEVEL	TYPE AND MODE OF TRANSPORTATION	STAGES
[redacted]	Low Water Stage	Majority of supplies probably trucked from Stung Treng to numerous transshipment points located within immediate Siempang area.	(1)
[redacted]	Intermediate Water Stage (Rising)	Majority of supplies probably shipped from Stung Treng to transshipment/storage area near Laos border. Additional supplies hauled by truck to transshipment points in immediate Siempang area, then transloaded on motorized river craft for the border area.	(2)
[redacted]	Extreme High Water Stage	Water-borne and truck traffic limited somewhat during peak rainfall in first part of August.	(3)
[redacted]	High Water Stage (Receding)	Majority of supplies probably shipped from Stung Treng to transshipment/storage area near Laos border. Additional supplies hauled by truck to transshipment points in immediate Siempang area, then transloaded on motorized river craft for the border area.	(4)
[redacted]	Intermediate Water Stage (Receding)	Majority of supplies probably trucked from Stung Treng to numerous transshipment points located within immediate Siempang area.	(5)

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

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NPIC L-6981 (2/67)

FIGURE 5. MOTORIZED RIVER CRAFT, TONLE KONG (RIVER)



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NPIC L-6982 (2/67)

FIGURE 6. TRANSLOADING POINT, LAOTIAN BANK, TONLE KONG (RIVER)

	Total Craft*	Tonnage Shipped Per Craft	Total Tonnage Per 61 Craft	Total Possible Trips	Total Metric Tons Shipped in a Month
[redacted]	61	1 metric ton**	61 M.T.	12	732 metric tons
	61	1 metric ton	61 M.T.	12	732 metric tons
	61	1 metric ton	61 M.T.	12	732 metric tons
	61	1 metric ton	61 M.T.	12	732 metric tons
	61	2 metric tons	122 M.T.	10	1220 metric tons
	61	2 metric tons	122 M.T.	10	1220 metric tons
	61	2 metric tons	122 M.T.	10	1220 metric tons
	61	2 metric tons	122 M.T.	10	1220 metric tons
	61	2 metric tons	122 M.T.	10	1220 metric tons
	61	2 metric tons	122 M.T.	10	1220 metric tons
	61	2 metric tons	122 M.T.	10	1220 metric tons
	61	1 metric ton	61 M.T.	12	732 metric tons

25X1D

Total metric tons shipped in 12-month period - 11,895 (approx.).

*Total number or motorized river craft observed on one photographic mission utilized as a base figure for analysis.

**1 metric ton = 2,204.62 pounds.



NPIC L-6933 (2/67)

25X1D

FIGURE 7. ROAD JUNCTION, SIEMPANG AREA, CAMBODIA



NPIC L-6934 (2/67)

25X1D

FIGURE 8. ROAD STATUS, UNNUMBERED ROAD, SIEMPANG AREA, LAOS

25X1C
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25X1D



NPIC L-6937 (2/67)

FIGURE 9. ROAD STATUS, ROUTE 97, CAMBODIA

25X1D



NPIC L-6938 (2/67)

FIGURE 10. ROAD STATUS, ROUTE 97, CAMBODIA

25X1C
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CONFIDENTIAL



25X1D [redacted]

FIGURE 12. PROBABLE TRUCKS, ROUTE 97, CAMBODIA



25X1D [redacted]

FIGURE 13. ROAD STATUS, ROUTE 97, CAMBODIA

25X1C
Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP78B04560A005900010016-7

[redacted]

25X1D





FIGURE 11. STRIP MOSAIC OF TONLE KONG (RIVER) SEGMENT, CAMBODIA/LAOS BORDER

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP78B04560A005900010016-7
25X1C
[redacted]

FIG 16
FIG 15
FIG 14
LAOS
TONLE KONG
14°32'N 106°23'E
N



25X1D

FIGURE 14. POSSIBLE SUPPORT AREA, ROUTE 97, CAMBODIA



25X1D

FIGURE 15. ROAD STATUS, ROUTE 97, CAMBODIA



25X1D

FIGURE 16. ROAD STATUS, ROUTE 97, CAMBODIA



25X1D

FIGURE 17. ROAD STATUS, ROUTE 97, CAMBODIA



25X1D

FIGURE 18. ROAD STATUS, ROUTE 110, LAOS



25X1D

FIGURE 19. ROAD STATUS, ROUTE 110, LAOS

25X1C
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CONFIDENTIAL
[redacted]

TRI-BORDER AREA

The Tri-Border insurgency area is positioned at the eastern extremity of the probable communist logistic net discussed earlier in this section and probably serves as a major redistribution point for personnel and supplies into South Vietnam.

25X1D

Insurgent activity was first identified in the area in [redacted] when low-level photography revealed extensive trail activity in remote areas, a variation in local agricultural patterns, and the abandonment of most native villages. Detailed interpretation of the area resulted in the identification of four probable insurgent encampments, containing a total of 39 partially concealed buildings and associated row cropping.

Subsequent completion in [redacted] of Laos Route 110, which extended to within approximately 1.5 nm of the Tri-Border area, apparently supported a substantial increase in insurgent activity in this northeastern most section of Ratanakiri province. At present 16 areas of probable insurgent activity consisting of encampments and associated agriculture have been identified on aerial photography and appear to be directly connected via numerous well concealed trails with the communist road net in Laos. Examples of this activity are provided on Figures 20, 21, and 22.

25X1D

25X1C
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CONFIDENTIAL
[redacted]

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP78B04560A005900010016-7

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP78B04560A005900010016-7

25X1D



FIGURE 20. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, TRI-BORDER AREA, CAMBODIA

25X1D



FIGURE 21. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, TRI-BORDER AREA, CAMBODIA

25X1D



FIGURE 22. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, TRI-BORDER AREA, CAMBODIA

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SECTION II

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP78B04560A005900010016-7

25X1C
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SECTION II

There is increasing evidence that the Tonle San (river) has became a major transportation artery in a probable communist logistics net extending from Stung Treng to the Cambodia/South Vietnam border areas adjacent to Duc Co, South Vietnam. A total of 28 probable insurgent facilities, including liaison stations, encampments, storage areas and transshipment points, have been identified in the vicinity of the river between Virachei and the border.

Unlike the Tonle Kong, the Tonle San is shallow and more susceptible to extreme low water periods. Motorized river craft have been observed navigating the river northeast of Stung Treng during rising intermediate and high water stages, but navigation is probably also curtailed during the 20 to 30-day extreme high water period.

25X1D

Although no statistics are available on motorized river craft observations during the [redacted] period, accurate figures are available on the 25X1D number of sightings between [redacted] A maximum one-day total of 18 motorized river craft was observed between Virachei and 14-01N 107-14E, approximately 7 nm west of the South Vietnam border. Throughout the latter 25X1D part of [redacted] a substantial increase in water-borne transportation on this segment of the Tonle San was observed as compared to a similar period in [redacted] (See "Detailed Analysis of Motorized River Craft," Section I, for estimated dimensions and capacities of these craft.) 25X1D

There have been only three recorded observations of motorized river craft on the western half of the Tonle San during the [redacted] period. A 25X1D single craft was observed 16 nm west of Virachei on [redacted] and two craft 4 25X1D nm west on [redacted] When compared with the distribution of sightings between 25X1D Virachei and the border as depicted on the accompanying map, the conclusion that Virachei is a major redistribution point is inescapable. Three newly constructed storage-type buildings were observed dispersed along the southern 25X1D bank of the river, approximately 0.5 nm west of Virachei on [redacted] In addition, Route 194 east from Siempang (discussed in Section I) and north from Route 19 at Bung Lung show evidence of increasingly heavy vehicular activity.



25X1D

FIGURE 23. SUSPECT INSURGENT SUPPORT AREA, KAMANG CHONG, CAMBODIA

25X1C
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A probable transshipment point and storage area (Figure 28) is located on the northern bank of the Tonle San, 0.5 nm west of the westernmost river craft sighting (See map, page 29). A well used trail (Figure 27) extends north to two probable insurgent encampments (Figure 26). Additional trails extend west to probably connect with the insurgent activity along the border.

Two additional probable transshipment points have been developed at the northern terminus of Route 197 (See map, page 33 and Figures 29 and 32). The location of these facilities indicates that they are probably served by the alternate Route 19/Route 197 road system from Stung Treng, rather than by the Tonle San water-borne route. One probable insurgent encampment is located adjacent to an abandoned village in the immediate vicinity of these facilities (Figure 31). Two buildings are being maintained in the village and the deterioration of the others is readily contrasted with the active village 1.1 nm north (Figure 30). The potential transshipping capacity of these facilities is disproportionate to the 22 other identified insurgent areas within a 20-nm radius (two depicted in Figures 33 and 34), most of which are adjacent to additional probable supply routes. These two transshipment points are therefore probably used predominantly for the further redistribution of supplies into South Vietnam.

Kamang Chong village (Figures 23 and 24) will be discussed in Section IV as a logical western extension of the insurgent activity in the Prek Drang (river) area.



25X1D

FIGURE 24. SUSPECT INSURGENT SUPPORT AREA, KAMANG CHONG, CAMBODIA

25X1D [redacted]



25X1D [redacted]



25X1D [redacted]

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FIGURE 25. MOTORIZED RIVER CRAFT, TONLE SAN (RIVER) CAMBODIA

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP78B04560A005900010016-7

25X1 25X1 NTL

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP78B04560A005900010016-7

25X1C
Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP78B04560A005900010016-7
CONFIDENTIAL
[redacted]



FIGURE 26. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENTS, TONLE SAN (RIVER) CAMBODIA

25X1D

25X1C
Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP78B04560A005900010016-7
CONFIDENTIAL
[redacted]

Approved [redacted]/17 : CIA-RDP78B04560A005900010016-7

25X1C

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1D



25X1C

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Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP78B04560A005900010016-7

L

IA, AUSTRALIA AND NZ

SOUTH VIETNAM

(SEE MAP, PAGE 29)

(SEE MAP, PAGE 33)

CAMBODIAN BORDER CHECKPOINT

ROUTE 197

ROUTE 19

S. 23, 24)



RAFT

6957 (2/67)

25X1C

25X1D

Approved For Release 200

25X1D



FIGURE 27. WELL USED TRAIL, TONLE SAN (RIVER) AREA, CAMBODIA

25X1D



FIGURE 28. PROBABLE TRANSSHIPMENT POINT AND STORAGE AREA, TONLE SAN (RIVER), CAMBODIA

25X1D



25X1D

25X1D



25X1D

FIGURE 29. PROBABLE TRANSSHIPMENT POINT, PH PAKAP, CAMBODIA

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25X1 CONTL

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP78B04560A005900010016-7



25X1D

FIGURE 30. UNNAMED VILLAGE, TONLE SAN (RIVER), CAMBODIA



25X1D

FIGURE 31. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, TONLE SAN (RIVER CAMBODIA



25X1D

25X1D



25X1D

NPIC L-6966 (2/67)

FIGURE 32. PROBABLE TRANSSHIPMENT POINT, PH BA KHAM, CAMBODIA



25X1D

FIGURE 33. SUSPECT INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, TONLE SAN (RIVER) AREA, CAMBODIA



25X1D

FIGURE 34. SUSPECT INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, TONLE SAN (RIVER) AREA, CAMBODIA

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SECTION III

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25X1C
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SECTION III

Stung Treng, Cambodia, with its expansive mooring and storage facilities, is located at the western extremity of extensive probable communist logistics nets probably supporting insurgent activity along the Cambodia/South Vietnam border between 14-41N 107-34E and 13-40N 107-34E. A complex road and water-borne network, including Cambodia Routes 13, 14, 19, 194, and 197, Laos Routes 96, 110, and 96/110, and the Tonle Kong, Tonle San, and Tonle Srepok (rivers), connects Stung Treng with the concentrated insurgent activity reported in Sections I, II, and IV.

25X1D

A comparison of aerial photography dated [redacted] revealed construction and concealment techniques at a probable insurgent support facility immediately south of Route 19 in a heavily wooded area at 13-24N 106-13E to be identical with those observed in the Kratie-Chhlong-O'Raing area of Cambodia.

Within this heavily wooded area approximately 16 nm southeast of Stung Treng, 20 partially concealed buildings were observed, 11 of which are depicted in Figure 39. The buildings are widely dispersed with vehicular track activity interconnecting them. By [redacted] re-foliation provided further concealment for this activity (See inset, Figure 39).

25X1D

25X1D

On aerial photography [redacted] a parked truck convoy containing 11 partially concealed trucks was observed along Route 19 immediately north of the installation. In addition, two large 10-wheel trucks were observed heading northeast on Route 19 approximately 16 nm northeast of the installation.

Because of the lengthy monsoon season in 1966 and a subsequent high volume of water on the Mekong, Tonle Kong, Tonle San, Tonle Srepok and numerous small tributaries, the vehicular causeway and ferry crossing at Stung Treng was believed to have been severely damaged. If so, this would explain the extended lull in vehicular traffic moving north from this area to Siempang via Routes 13 and 14 (tentatively redesignated 136).



25X1D

NPIC L-6970 (2/67)

FIGURE 35. POSSIBLE CONSTRUCTION CAMP, ROUTE 13, CAMBODIA

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25X1D

25X1D

The vehicular causeway was observed to be very active in [redacted] until the deluge of early monsoon rain that continued until late [redacted] critically disrupted activity of this vital transportation link. Comparison of aerial photography dated [redacted] revealed extensive repair of the causeway during the period despite the high water that existed until early [redacted]. Vehicular traffic was believed resumed in late [redacted] (See Figure 38). Although limited data base aerial photography hampers comparison of road conditions in [redacted], some evidence is available that indicates repairs on Route 13. This route is a suspected prime route of supply for communist forces in adjacent Laos and the Tri-Border area. This is further exemplified by continuing efforts to maintain this road throughout the year.

25X1D 25X1D 25X1D 25X1D

Of additional photographic importance is the resurfacing of Route 13 that apparently began in early [redacted] and was subsequently interrupted by the early monsoon rains (See Figures 36 and 37). A probable road construction camp observed on aerial photography in [redacted] is located immediately east of Route 13 at 13-49N 106-07E (See Figure 35). The manner of concealment suggests it is being used for liaison purposes as well as serving road construction personnel.

25X1D 25X1D

At present, Route 13 has been resurfaced north of Stung Treng from the vehicular causeway and ferry crossing to 13-46N 106-06E. Additional fresh piles of aggregate were observed along both sides of the route to approximately 13-51N 106-05E where an access road was obscured extending west to the Cambodian military installation at Ban Huoi Muong. One of the purposes for maintaining this segment of Route 13 is to service the military camp at Ban Huoi Muong. Of more significance however, are heavy vehicular tracks observed throughout [redacted] extending northeast from Route 13 along Route 14 to the Siempang area (Figure 38). Additional evidence of related heavy vehicular activity in the Siempang area was discussed in Section I.

25X1D

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

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[redacted]

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

NPIC L-6971 (2/67)

FIGURE 36. TERMINUS OF ROAD RESURFACING, ROUTE 13, CAMBODIA

25X1D

NPIC L-6972 (2/67)

FIGURE 37. PILES OF ROAD AGGREGATE, ROUTE 13, CAMBODIA

25X1D



NPIC L-6973 (2/67)

FIGURE 38. ROAD STATUS, ROUTE 14, CAMBODIA

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

FIGURE 39. PROBABLE INSURGENT SUPPORT FACILITY, ROUTE 19, CAMBODIA

25X1D

25X1D

25X1D

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SECTION IV

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SOUTH VIETNAM

A/W POSITIONS AND TRENCHING

(FIG.40)

VEHICLE TRACKS

TRAIL BORDER CROSSING

FOXHOLES

HMG/AA SITE

PARTIALLY CONCEALED HUTS

FOXHOLES

TRAIL BORDER CROSSING

PREK DRANG (RIVER)

(FIG. 41)

FOXHOLES

PARTIALLY CONCEALED HUTS

A/W POSITIONS

CAMBODIA

TRENCHING

PARTIALLY CONCEALED HUTS

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1ST EDITION 64 & 65
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SECTION IV

In [redacted] during the Chu Pong mountain battle that raged throughout the Ia Drang valley in South Vietnam, photographic analysis of adjoining areas in Cambodia, particularly the Prek Drang valley, revealed photographic evidence of numerous well used trails crisscrossing the border areas generally from one remote heavily wooded area to another equally remote area. Defensive positions including heavy machine guns (HMG/AA), trenches, and foxholes were identified on aerial photography in the vicinity of 13-32N 107-35E and well inside Cambodia to a maximum of approximately 5 nm. 25X1D

A detailed search of Ratanakeri Province as far west as the administrative capital of Lomphat revealed at that time only scant evidence of partially concealed, thatched buildings. By [redacted] however, comparative photography left little doubt that communist forces were utilizing the sanctuary of Cambodia on a more permanent basis. Numerous thatched buildings with associated trails, defense positions, and row crop agriculture had appeared in widely dispersed areas throughout the Prek Drang, Prek Nam Lieou, and O'Kamang Chong river valleys. Approximately 51 areas of probable communist activity have been identified or confirmed by NPIC to date. 25X1D

Kamang Chong village, approximately 15 nm east of Lomphat, is of particular significance. In November 1965, a group of Rhade traders trained as observers in South Vietnam, reported large numbers of communist forces bivouaced in this area. A comparison of data base photography taken in [redacted] and medium level photography taken in [redacted] revealed extreme variations from local agricultural patterns and corresponding changes in local social patterns (i.e. increased trail activity and ground scarring without a substantial change in the number of village dwellings). 25X1D 25X1D

The traders reported that a new field hospital had been constructed in the area, and one large isolated building, not conforming to local architectural patterns, was observed on photography immediately south of the village. Photography of [redacted] revealed probable trenching within the village and increased trail activity. 25X1D

The accompanying map and photographs (Figures 40 and 41) identify the predominantly defensive activity in the vicinity of the Prek Drang (river) at the Cambodia/South Vietnam border. Kamang Chong is depicted in Figures 23 and 24 of Section II and the additional probable insurgent activity is located on the large map accompanying that section (page 27).

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

25X1D

FIGURE 40. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, PREK DRANG (RIVER) AREA, CAMBODIA.

FIGURE 41. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, PREK DRANG (RIVER) AREA, CAMBODIA.



25X1D

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SECTION V

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SECTION V

A concentration of insurgent facilities is located along the Tonle Srepok (river) in the vicinity of 13-03N 108-26E, approximately 40 nm southeast of Lomphat. The area was first identified on aerial photography in [redacted] 25X1D and is possibly utilized for rest and rehabilitation. A comparison between photography dated [redacted] revealed a substantial 25X1D increase in activity, including the construction of at least 126 partially concealed buildings within 7 probable insurgent encampments (1 shown in Figure 42).

The encampments are widely dispersed along the river adjacent to the South Vietnam border and are connected by a complex system of trails which converge and extend across the border to Ban Don, South Vietnam. The exact reason for the increase in the number of buildings cannot be determined. It could reflect an increase in insurgent activity, a need for more permanent shelters during the rainy season, a readiness to take advantage of the additional tree canopy, or a combination of these factors.

A probable insurgent base area is located in a mountainous area on the Cambodia/South Vietnam border, approximately 4 nm northeast of the encampments. Within the east-west oriented perimeter measuring approximately 4 nm by 1 nm, are at least 40 well dispersed buildings with associated trails and extensive scarring.

An additional probable insurgent encampment containing approximately 20 partially concealed buildings and numerous trails is located in a heavily wooded area, approximately 8.5 nm south of the river. Other probable insurgent facilities/ activity are indicated on the large scale map on the opposite page.

The strong point at Mereuch, approximately 0.2 nm northwest of the probable insurgent encampments, remains active; however, the service road, which showed evidence of heavy vehicular traffic from [redacted] is now overgrown 25X1D and in disuse. The possible abandonment of this installation by Cambodian personnel and resulting reduction in local control of the area may also partially explain the noted increase in insurgent activity.

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

25X1D
[redacted]
NO BUILDINGS
DISCERNIBLE

25X1D

25X1D
[redacted]
20 BUILDINGS
DISCERNIBLE

25X1D

*FPIC L-6979 (2/67)

FIGURE 42. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, TONLE SREPOK (RIVER) AREA, CAMBODIA.

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

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SECTION VI

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SECTION VI

A complex road and logistics network has been developed in Kratie and Mondulkiri provinces, Cambodia, apparently to support the approximately 60 probable insurgent encampments near the Cambodia/South Vietnam border. The road net, comprised of an unnumbered road and portions of Routes 13, 131, and 14, extends from the Kratie area and a suspect transshipment point at Chhlong, 12-14N 105-59E, to the heavily wooded Nam Lyr-Yok Lom mountain areas of southeastern Mondulkiri province at 12-45N 107-30E.

Although continuing photographic reconnaissance has not revealed substantial amounts of vehicular traffic on this road net during daylight hours (the camouflaged truck convoy on Route 13 Figure 48 is an exception), evidence of heavy vehicular track activity has been observed throughout [redacted] It is believed a majority of this vehicular activity is conducted during the hours of darkness in an attempt to keep movement undetected. 25X1D

Within the western portions of this road net three probable insurgent support facilities directly associated with the unnumbered road were identified at intervals between 4 and 12 nms (one depicted in Figure 47). Additional probable support facilities are located in the immediate area of Snoul.

At the westernmost portion of the road net, a transshipment point and storage facility was identified at 12-14N 105-59E on the Prek Chhlong (river), 1.2 nm south of the Mekong (Figure 44). Comprised of four large warehouses and 12 associated buildings with a mooring area along the river bank, the facility was imaged on aerial photography as early as [redacted] It is conceivable that this installation was directly affiliated with the local economy as late as [redacted] however, during [redacted] the unnumbered road originating at the facility displayed photographic signatures of heavy use despite no evidence of connection with the Chinese communist paper plant at Chhlong or logistic importance to the military complex in Kratie. Furthermore, the construction of two probable insurgent 25X1D 25X1D 25X1D



25X1D [redacted]

FIGURE 43. UNNUMBERED ROAD, CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA

support facilities (i.e. truck park/storage areas) along the unnumbered road east of the transshipment facility supports an earlier suspicion that the facility was a link in the overall logistics network serving the insurgent encampments and storage facilities in southeastern Mondulkiri and Kratie provinces. Present construction of a road bridge immediately adjacent to the transshipment facility could significantly increase the potential volume of vehicular traffic if alternate Mekong river port facilities are used.

25X1D Approximately 3 nm southeast of Chhlong at 12-12N 106-02E, a probable insurgent support facility was first observed under construction along the unnumbered road in mid [redacted]

25X1D [redacted] revealed 12 partially concealed buildings (six shown on Figure 47), extensive vehicular tracking, a vehicle turn loop, and six trucks within the truck park/storage area. Construction methods and the manner in which secondary vegetation has been allowed to overgrow the facility resembles signatures of known communist truck park facilities identified in Laos during a similar period (compare Figures 46 and 47). An additional probable insurgent storage facility was identified another 12 nm east on the north side of the road at 12-16N 106-11E. This facility contains numerous partially concealed buildings and evidence of extensive vehicular truck activity.

At the eastern terminus of the unnumbered roads with Route 13 at 12-18N 106-18E, a probable truck park containing two probable trucks was identified on

25X1D aerial photography dated [redacted] (Figure 45). Just north of the truck park,

25X1D a probable storage/support facility is located on both sides of Route 13 near a possibly abandoned Cambodian military camp. At least 16 partially concealed

25X1D buildings are dispersed in an area of heavy vehicular tracking. On [redacted] numerous unidentified crates/boxes were observed scattered throughout the area, and a truck convoy consisting of five camouflaged vehicles was observed at 12-17N 106-25E heading east on Route 13.

Additional support/storage areas containing numerous partially concealed buildings and extensive vehicular truck and trail activity are located in remote areas adjacent to and east of Snoul at 12-04N 106-29E and west of the plantation at 12-02N 106-21E.

The western half of the road net extending from Route 13 is comprised of Route 131, Route 14, the southernmost Cambodian segment of Route 13, and three unnumbered roads which reach into South Vietnam. Thirty-three additional probable insurgent encampments have been identified in the area included by this half of the road net, 15 of which are depicted on the opposite map.

Eleven of these encampments are located in an area south of Route 131 represented by the map of page 59 and are discussed in detail on page 58. This area includes the segment of Route 13 and 2 unnumbered roads which lead into South Vietnam (Figure 43).

The remaining 7 encampments are referenced on a photographic mosaic on page 69, accompanied by a detailed discussion. An unnumbered road leading into South Vietnam serves as a southern route for supplies coming along Route 131 and southwest along Route 14 from O'Raing.

The Mimot Plantation area along Route 7 southwest of Snoul has also shown evidence of extensive insurgent activity, a discussion of which begins on page 78.

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

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

● PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENTS/ SUPPORT FACILITIES

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

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NPIC L-6985 (2/67)

FIGURE 44. TRANSSHIPMENT POINT AND STORAGE FACILITY, CHHLONG AREA, CAMBODIA



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NPIC L-6986 (2/67)

FIGURE 45. TRUCK PARK, ROUTE 13 AREA, CAMBODIA

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

NPIC L-6987 (2/67)

FIGURE 46. COMMUNIST TRUCK PARK AND SUPPORT FACILITY, ROUTE 92, LAOS

25X1D



NPIC L-6988 (2/67)

FIGURE 47. PROBABLE INSURGENT SUPPORT FACILITY, CHHLONG AREA, CAMBODIA

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

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NPIC L-6989 (2/67)

FIGURE 48. TRUCK CONVOY, ROUTE 13, CAMBODIA

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VEHICULAR BORDER CROSSINGS

This area of intensive probable insurgent activity, centered at 12-02N 106-04E, integrates Cambodian Routes 13 and 131 with the probable communist trail network in adjacent Binh Long Province, South Vietnam (see map on opposite page). Extensive vehicular track activity is evident crossing the South Vietnam border in 2 areas, and 11 probable insurgent encampments have been identified (8 shown in Figures 49, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, and 59).

The first evidence of border crossings was observed on aerial photography in the western sector. The tracks began approximately 2.5 nm north of a Cambodian border post (Figure 51) on Route 13, continue east for approximately
25X1D 2.7 nm to a junction, then southeast crossing the South Vietnam border at UTM [redacted] Two probable insurgent encampments are located on the South Vietnamese side of the crossing, consisting of numerous partially concealed buildings, foxholes, and a system of trenches (Figures 52 and 53). The unnumbered route continues south through an area of abandoned villages to a heavily wooded area north of a rubber plantation where the tracks become obscured by a heavy tree canopy (Figure 50).

25X1D

FIGURE 49. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA

Two access roads extend into the area from Route 131, at least one of which crosses the border to terminate at the abandoned village of Srok Monn Tat, 11-57N 106-40E. Just south of their junctions with Route 131, three probable insurgent encampments were observed containing at least 30 partially concealed buildings. One of these encampments is partially shown in Figure 49. Four other encampments containing partially concealed buildings are located just across the border (Figures 56 through 59). Well used trails extend further south from the encampments to terminate in a rubber plantation immediately northeast of Toc Ninh.

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

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FIGURE 50. UNNUMBERED ROAD, CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA



25X1D

FIGURE 51. CAMBODIAN STRONGPOINT, ROUTE 13, CAMBODIA

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[redacted]



FIGURE 52. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, CAMBODIA SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA

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[redacted]



25X1D

FIGURE 53. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA



25X1D

NPIC L-6996 (2/67)

FIGURE 54. UNNUMBERED ROAD, CAMBODIA SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA



25X1D

NPIC L-6997 (2/67)

FIGURE 55. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, CAMBODIA SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA

25X1C
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CONFIDENTIAL



25X1D

FIGURE 56. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA

25X1C
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CONFIDENTIAL

25X1C
Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP78B04560A005900010016-7
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[redacted]



25X1D

FIGURE 57. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, CAMBODIA SOUTH VIET NAM BORDER AREA.

25X1C
Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP78B04560A005900010016-7
CONFIDENTIAL
[redacted]



25X1D

NPIC L-7000 (2/67)

FIGURE 58. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA.



25X1D

NPIC L-7001 (2/67)

FIGURE 59. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA.

INSURGENT BASE AREA

25X1D

Aerial photography of [redacted] identified an extensive probable insurgent base area developing in this Ph Omoha area, approximately 19 nm southwest of O'Raing at 12-08N 106-53E (See Mosaic, Page 69). A newly constructed road was first observed in [redacted] to extend southeast from Ph Omoha (Figure 64) to within 0.5 nm of the border. By [redacted] a possible trail/road clearing was observed which extends the route to within 0.4 nm of the Dak Huyt stream, where it is obscured by heavy tree foliage (Figure 60). A footbridge provides crossing of the Dak Huyt stream approximately 1.8 nm southwest of the visible trail/road clearing terminus (Figure 71). 25X1D 25X1D

Within the immediate vicinity, 10 separate areas of extensive plots of row crop agriculture with approximately 75 well dispersed, partially concealed buildings were observed (Figures 67, 68 and 70-72). For comparison, a typical Cambodian village (Mnong tribe) with its associated slash and burn agriculture is depicted in Figure 63. It is representative of the native pattern along Route 14 and is readily contrasted with the covert activity in the above areas.

25X1D



FIGURE 60. SOUTHERNMOST CONFIRMED EXTENSION OF UNNUMBERED ROAD, CAMBODIA SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA

In addition to the road, a well used trail is observed immediately south of Ph Omoha extending east from Route 14 then southeast to within approximately 0.5 nm of the border, where it is obscured by a heavy tree canopy. A probable insurgent support/storage area was observed north of Ph Omoha adjacent to the Prek Chhlong stream consisting of 3 separate storage areas, 14 partially concealed buildings, a possible refuel area with a vehicle turn loop, a possible administrative/support area containing 2 large buildings, and numerous smaller support buildings (Figure 62). Extensive vehicular track activity was observed throughout the immediate area, with row crop agriculture observed adjacent to the possible administrative/support area.

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

25X1D

FIGURE 61. AREA OF CONCENTRATED PROBABLE INSURGENT

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25X1C

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP78B04560A005900010016-7

R-30/67



ACTIVITY, CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA

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

25X1D [redacted]

NPIC L-7004 (2/67)

FIGURE 63. TYPICAL CAMBODIAN VILLAGE (MNONG TRIBE), ROUTE 14, CAMBODIA.

25X1D



25X1D [redacted]

NPIC L-7005 (2/67)

FIGURE 64. JUNCTION OF UNNUMBERED ROAD AND ROUTE 14, CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA.



25X1D

FIGURE 62. PROBABLE INSURGENT SUPI



PORT FACILITY, ROUTE 14, CAMBODIA.

25X1C
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CONFIDENTIAL



NPIC L-7006 (2/67)

FIGURE 65. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA

25X1D

25X1C
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25X1C
Approved For Release 2000/04/12 : CIA-RDP78B04560A005900010016-7
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

25X1D

NPIC L-7007 (2/67)

FIGURE 66. HEAVILY DAMAGED INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA.



25X1D

NPIC L-7008 (2/67)

FIGURE 67. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, CAMBODIA SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA.

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CONFIDENTIAL



25X1D

NPIC L-7009 (2/67)

FIGURE 68. PROBABLE INSURGENT STORAGE FACILITY, CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA.



25X1D

NPIC L-7010 (2/67)

FIGURE 69. HEAVILY DAMAGED INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, SOUTH VIETNAM/CAMBODIA BORDER AREA.



25X1D

FIGURE 70. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, CAMBODIA SOUTH VIE NAM BORDER AREA.



25X1D

FIGURE 71. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, CAMBODIA SOUTH VIE NAM BORDER AREA



25X1D [redacted]

FIGURE 72. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA

25X1C
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25X1D

MIMOT PLANTATION AREA

An area of insurgent activity probably used as a rest and rehabilitation area for communist personnel was identified 4.7 nm north of the Mimot plantation area on [redacted] Vehicular tracks extend north from the Mimot plantation hospital complex through an area densely populated by local Khmer natives, then into a remote heavily wooded area where tracks terminate at the Prek Chriv stream. Numerous vehicular access roads were observed within this remote area, along with five probable insurgent encampments. The camps contain at least 50 partially concealed buildings widely dispersed and interconnected by a series of well concealed trails (See Figures 74 through 78).

Because of the close proximity to hospital facilities at Mimot, the general area of insurgency is believed to be utilized as a rest and rehabilitation area for wounded NVA/VC personnel. It would be well to note that vehicular tracks observed in this area of insurgency lead directly to the hospital complex at Mimot (Figure 73).

25X1C
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[redacted]



25X1D

FIGURE 73. MIMOT PLANTATION HOSPITAL COMPLEX, CAMBODIA

25X1C
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[redacted]

25X1C
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

25X1D

NPIC L-7016 (2/67)

FIGURE 74. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, MIMOT PLANTATION AREA, CAMBODIA

25X1C
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25X1C
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CONFIDENTIAL



25X1D

FIGURE 75. SUSPECT INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, MIMOT PLANTATION AREA, CAMBODIA

25X1C
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CONFIDENTIAL



25X1D

FIGURE 76. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENTS, MIMOT PLANTATION AREA, CAMBODIA



25X1D

FIGURE 77. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, MIMOT PLANTATION AREA, CAMBODIA



25X1D

FIGURE 78. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENTS, MIMOT PLANTATION AREA, CAMBODIA

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SECTION VII

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SECTION VII

The Route 14-Route 141 area, in the vicinity of Dak Dam, forms the eastern extremity of the previously identified probable logistics net extending from the Mekong into the Yok Lam-Nam Lyr mountain complex in southern Mondalkiri Province. The high concentration of insurgent facilities adjacent to and at the terminus of motorable access roads between 12-23N 107-30E and 12-45N 107-26E is comparable to communist activity in the Laotian Panhandle.

The major supporting vehicular artery in the area is an approximately 30-nm long circular unnumbered road connecting Route 14 and Route 141 (see accompanying map). Thirty of the 36 identified probable insurgent facilities in the Dak Dam area are located adjacent to two access roads which extend from the unnumbered road toward the South Vietnam border (three shown in Figures 81, 82, and 83). Both the unnumbered road and the access roads exhibit evidence of frequent vehicular activity (Figures 79 and 80).

Four encampments have been identified immediately south of the Nam Lyr mountain area and 2 more are located approximately 9 nm northwest of Dak Dam.

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

SERIES JOG(G) 1501
SHEET ND 48-16
ST EDITION DEC 65
SCALE 1:250,000

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25X1D



FIGURE 79. VEHICULAR ACTIVITY, UNNUMBERED ROAD, CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA

25X1D



FIGURE 80. VEHICULAR ACTIVITY, UNNUMBERED ROAD, CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA

25X1D



FIGURE 81. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, CAMBODIA SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA

25X1D

FIGURE 82. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA

25X1D

FIGURE 83. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA

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SECTION VIII

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SECTION VIII

A probable insurgent base area located approximately 12.5 nm north of Svuay Rieng in the vicinity of 11-17N 105-48E provides a classic example of concentrated encampments with perimeter defenses. At least 102 partially concealed buildings, with associated row crop agriculture and foxholes, are located along the Prek Anlung Kei (stream) in a swamp area approximately 3.5 nm west of the South Vietnam border (Figures 88-90).

Perimeter defenses consisting of an elaborate trench system and numerous foxholes are located immediately east of the base area at 300 and 1,000 yard intervals inside South Vietnam (Figures 86 and 87). Additional trenching and foxholes are located within Cambodia, approximately 2.5 nm southeast (Figure 85). Heavily used trails are observed throughout this latter area and continues east across the South Vietnam border to the Ban Tao (swamp) area.

An additional concentration of probable insurgent activity is located approximately 5 nm southwest of Svay Rieng at 11-02N 105-43E [redacted] 25X1D where at least 8 partially concealed buildings are observed in an isolated stand of trees (Figure 84).

25X1D [redacted]

FIGURE 84. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, SVAY RIENG AREA, CAMBODIA

25X1C
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SOUTH VIETNAM

CAMBODIA

(SEE MAP, PAGE 95)

ROUTE 1

SVAY RIENG

PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT (FIG.84)

SOUTH VIETNAM

SERIES JOG(G) 1501
SHEETS NC 48-3, 48-6 & 48-7
1ST EDITION 64 & 65
SCALE 1:250,000

25X1C
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25X1D

FIGURE 85. PROBABLE INSURGENT PERIMETER DEFENSES, CAM



25X1D

FIGURE 86. PROBABLE INSURGENT PERIMETER DEFENSES, RACH NANG DINH (STREAM), SOUTH VIETNAM



25X1D

FIGURE 87. PROBABLE INSURGENT PERIMETER DEFENSES, RACH NANG DINH (STREAM), SOUTH VIETNAM, CAMBODIA BORDER AREA

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

25X1D [redacted]

FIGURE 88. PROBABLE INSURGENT ENCAMPMENT, PREK ANLUNG KEI (STREAM) CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA

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25X1 CONTL

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

25X1D

LONG KEI STREAM, CAMBODIA SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA

JG KEI STREAM, CAMBODIA SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER AREA

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